Fixed Fees, Equality and Diversity by Griffith, Adam J. G.
FIXED FEES, EQUALITY AND DIVERSITY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the proposal to introduce fixed fees in England and Wales in 
social welfare law, and in particular in the categories of housing, employment, debt and 
welfare benefits.  
Drawing on an analysis of cases reported in 2005-06, the paper highlights concerns 
about the introduction of fixed fees, given the relationship between case costs and 
• The types of cases taken on 
• The extent of work done for clients 
• The results achieved for clients  
• The geographical region where the case is handled 
• The types of clients helped 
The paper focuses on the potential impact on members of BME communities, 
especially in London, and concludes that the introduction of fixed fees is likely to have a 
discriminatory impact.   
1 Introduction 
1.1 The legal aid scheme in England and Wales is facing dramatic changes as a result of 
the Carter report1 and its proposed implementation by the Ministry of Justice [MOJ, 
formerly DCA] and the Legal Services Commission [LSC].  
1.2 The proposed changes are extremely controversial. The implementation of the 
Carter report has been severely criticised by the House of Commons Constitutional 
Affairs Committee [CAC].2 It has also been the subject of a number of threatened 
and actual judicial reviews, by the Law Society, the Society of Asian Lawyers / Black 
Solicitors Network and others.  
1.3 One issue that has been particularly controversial is the likely effect of the proposed 
reforms on black and minority ethnic [BME] firms and communities. These concerns 
are highlighted in the CAC report3 and in some of the judicial reviews. It has been 
suggested that there has been a failure to carry out a proper or comprehensive race 
impact assessment and that the proposed implementation of the reforms may be in 
breach of the Race Relations Act 1976 as amended.  
1.4 At the time of writing, the government’s response to the CAC report is still awaited.  
1.5 The Advice Services Alliance [ASA] is the umbrella organisation for independent 
advice networks in the UK. Our particular concerns relate to the proposed 
introduction of fixed fees in the categories of social welfare law.  
                                            
1 Legal Aid: A market-based approach to reform, July 2006  
2 House of Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee: Implementation of the Carter Review of Legal 
Aid, Third Report of Session 2006-07, May 2007.  
3 See Chapter 7: The impact of the reforms on BME firms and clients  
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1.6 We have recently completed an analysis of all cases reported by NfP agencies and 
solicitors firms, during 2005-06, in the main social welfare law categories of housing, 
welfare benefits, debt and employment.4 This complements an earlier analysis that 
we did of NfP case lengths in 2004-05.5 As on that occasion, we are extremely 
grateful to Peter Watson of Citizens Advice for the data analysis.  
1.7 This paper highlights some of the key findings from our analysis and in particular our 
concern that the introduction of national fixed fees in social welfare law is likely to 
discriminate against clients in London, members of BME communities, and BME 
clients in London in particular.  
2 The road to fixed fees  
2.1 The introduction of fixed fees in social welfare law represents both a significant 
change from the way in which suppliers have been paid until now, and a stage in a 
wider process that has been developing for some time. Standard fees have existed 
in criminal legal aid since 1988 (in the Crown Court) and 1993 (in the magistrates 
court). A graduated fee scheme for barristers in the family courts has existed since 
2001.6  
2.2 Until 2004, both solicitors firms and NfP agencies were paid for cases on the basis of 
an hourly rate, although firms were paid on a case-by-case basis whereas NfPs were 
paid on the basis of the total number of hours worked.  
2.3 During 2004 however the LSC introduced a system of “tailored fixed fees”, under 
which solicitors firms were paid a fixed amount per case, calculated on the basis of 
the average cost per case in each firm in 2003-04. Firms could however ask for 
payment at hourly rates for “exceptional” cases that cost more than three times the 
tailored fixed fee. This system was originally available on a voluntary basis, but 
became mandatory for most areas of family and civil legal help in April 2005. 
However it did not apply to immigration and asylum cases, and remains voluntary for 
mental health cases.7  
2.4 The Carter report proposed the introduction of a system of fixed or graduated fees as 
an interim step prior to the introduction of a market-based approach by way of “Best 
Value Tendering”.  
2.5 When the Carter report was published, the LSC/DCA published their own proposals 
in a consultation paper entitled “Legal Aid: a sustainable future”. For the main 
categories of social welfare law this paper proposed the introduction of fixed fees 
based either on national or regional rates, based on the claims made by solicitors 
firms during 2005-06. The paper proposed that all cases would be paid by fixed fees, 
save for those cases which cost more than four times the fixed fee (“exceptional” 
cases), which would be paid on the basis of hourly rates.    
2.6 Although the LSC/DCA stated their preference for national fees, they recognised that 
such a move would particularly hit suppliers in London, where average case costs 
are generally much higher.8 
                                            
4 Case Lengths, Case Costs and Fixed fees, available at 
http://www.asauk.org.uk/fileLibrary/pdf/CaseLCFF.pdf 
5 Case Lengths Under NfP Contracts, available at 
http://www.asauk.org.uk/fileLibrary/pdf/cslgthnfpcon.pdf 
6 CAC report paras 53-56 
7 CAC report para 57  
8 Legal aid: a sustainable future p.28  
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 2.7 Following the consultation, the LSC/DCA published their further proposals in a 
document entitled “Legal Aid Reform: the Way Ahead”. This proposed that there 
should be national fees, not regional fees, that the calculations for these fees should 
be based on the costs of NfP agencies as well as solicitors firms, and that cases 
could be paid “exceptionally” on the basis of hourly rates if they cost more than three 
times the national fixed fee.  
2.8 The difference between the fees originally proposed in the “Sustainable future” paper 
and the fees now proposed can be seen from the following table.  
Table 1: the fixed fees originally and finally proposed 
  Debt  Employment Housing9 Welfare 
benefits 
Sustainable 
future 
Proposed 
national fee 
£127 £229 £163 or 
£188 
£143 
Sustainable 
future 
Proposed 
London fee  
£189 £453 £206 or 
£237 
£223 
Way ahead Proposed 
national fee 
£196 £225 £171 £164 
3 ASA’s concerns 
General 
3.1 In our response to the consultation paper “Legal Aid: a sustainable future”,10 we 
argued that the introduction of fixed fees is likely to be seriously detrimental to the 
provision of advice and assistance in social welfare law, given 
• The variation in case lengths/costs that exists within these categories  
• The likely effects on suppliers 
• The likely effects on the cases that suppliers take on 
• The likely effect on quality 
• The likely effect on the overall provision of services to clients in social welfare 
law.  
3.2 We also argued that the introduction of fixed fees was likely to work against the 
LSC’s separate proposal to contract only with quality tested “preferred suppliers”.  
3.3 We argued that further research needs to be carried out into the types of cases 
undertaken in social welfare law; the types of clients helped; the case mix of different 
providers and the factors that are linked to different case lengths.  
3.4 We suggested that alternative proposals should be considered, including: an 
extension of tailored fixed fees; higher fee levels; more categories of fees; graduated 
fees; more sophisticated escape mechanisms; and special provision for niche 
organisations.  
3.5 Some of the arguments we put forward are directly relevant to the issues highlighted 
in this paper.   
                                            
9 The “Sustainable future” paper proposed two different rates for housing cases. The “Way ahead” 
paper proposed one composite rate.  
10 ASA’s response is available at http://www.asauk.org.uk/fileLibrary/pdf/LASUSres.pdf 
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Case mix  
3.6 Where suppliers have average case lengths/costs that are higher than the value of 
the fixed fee, the incentive will be to reduce their average case lengths/costs. This is 
likely to involve 
• Looking for the easy/short cases and the easy clients and/or 
• Avoiding long, difficult and complex cases and clients.   
3.7 Where suppliers have average case lengths/costs that are equivalent to or lower 
than the value of the fixed fee, the incentive will be to maintain their previous case 
mix. There will be no incentive to widen their case mix to take on a significant 
number of cases that exceed the value of the fixed fee.11  
Quality  
3.8 There is clearly a potential conflict between fixed fees and quality. This was 
demonstrated by research carried out for the LSC reported in 2001.12 This research 
found that solicitors funded to provide a fixed number of matter starts for a fixed fee 
performed worse than other suppliers in the three areas of quality (as measured by 
peer review), client satisfaction and outcomes.  
3.9 Where suppliers have case lengths/costs which are higher than the value 
represented by the fixed fee there is likely to be a direct relationship between fixed 
fees and quality.  
3.10 It seems to us inevitable that economic pressures will cause standards to fluctuate 
considerably. In some cases work might be done well up to a certain point and then 
stopped. Other cases might be taken to their conclusion but the work done in a more 
cursory manner. There is likely to be a general trend towards routinising cases, with 
the result that individual cases do not receive the attention that their particular 
characteristics deserve.  
3.11 There is also a real risk that the introduction of fixed fees will drive out some good 
suppliers, who feel unable to deliver quality services within the fixed fees proposed, 
while retaining some high volume suppliers who may not be providing quality 
services. This would run counter to Lord Carter’s recommendations about the 
importance of quality.    
4 Our findings   
The data  
4.1 The LSC has provided ASA with anonymised details of all the cases completed 
under NfP and solicitor contracts in 2005-06 in the four main categories of social 
welfare law. The number and distribution of cases reported was as follows: 
  
                                            
11 In the Standard Terms of the new Unified Contract the LSC has now included a “fixed fee margin” 
key performance indicator, which could mean that suppliers making a “profit” of more than 20% out of 
the new fixed fees will be penalised.  
12 Moorhead et al Quality and Cost: Final Report of the Contracting of Civil, Non-Family Advice and 
Assistance Pilot (2001)  
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 Table 2: Distribution of cases between NfPs and solicitors firms 
 Housing Benefits Debt Employment Total 
NfPs 35,823 55,677 48,537 4,566 144,603
Solicitors firms 55,404 23,344 15,374 5,568 99,690 
Total  91,227 79,021 63,911 10,134 244,293
NfP Percentage 39% 70% 76% 45% 59% 
Solicitors 
Percentage  
61% 30% 24% 55% 41% 
 
4.2 The details provided are those recorded by organisations when reporting cases as 
closed, using the “SPAN” coding framework then in force.13  
4.3 Since NfPs recorded all their work in 2005-06 as “time”, we refer to their case lengths 
in terms of minutes. During 2005-06 solicitors firms were paid “tailored fixed fees” 
(based on their average case costs in 2003-04),14 but reported the profit costs they 
would otherwise have claimed in pounds (£). The analysis that follows uses the profit 
costs figures so recorded.   
4.4 In order to consider the likely effects of the introduction of fixed fees, we have also 
converted the average times recorded by NfPs into costs, on the assumption that 
NfPs are paid on average £50 per hour.  
4.5 The national averages (and the proposed fixed fees) are as follows:  
Table 3: Average case lengths/costs compared to the proposed fixed fees 
Category Nfp Average in 
minutes 
NfP Average at 
£50 per hour 
Solicitors 
average 
Proposed 
fixed fee 
Housing 234 minutes £195 £200 £171 
Benefits 274 minutes £228 £180 £164 
Debt 314 minutes £262 £152 £196 
Employment 430 minutes £358 £325 £225 
 
4.6 We have related the average length of cases in each category to:  
• The type of case (as recorded in the SPAN system as “Matter Type Part 1”, and  
“Matter Type Part 2” 15)  
• The extent of work done for clients 
                                            
13 See the ‘Guidance for reporting work under general civil contracts: Controlled work – the SPAN 
system’ published by the LSC, available at: 
http://www.legalservices.gov.uk/docs/forms/span_guidance_0406.pdf   
14 Unless the case cost more than three times the tailored fixed fee, in which case solicitors could 
claim their actual profit costs.  
15 The Matter Type Part I is usually a general description of the type of case. The Matter Type Part II 
records further information such as the nature of the advice given (benefits), the client’s needs (debt) 
or the client’s circumstances (housing and employment).  
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• The results achieved for clients 16  
• The LSC region in which the case was carried out 
• The client’s disability status and ethnicity 
4.7 It is important to remember that there may well be factors not covered within the 
SPAN recording system that impact on case lengths. One big unknown factor is the 
identity and behaviour of the “other side” involved in a case, and the effect that this 
has on case lengths.  
Types of cases 
4.8 There are substantial differences in average case lengths or costs depending on the 
type of case. For example:  
In welfare benefits 
• Cases take longer if classified as a benefit challenge and shorter if classified as 
advice on entitlement.17  
• Cases take longer if classified as involving an appeal and especially an appeal to 
the Social Security Commissioners. Cases reported as involving a review take 
less time than the average.18   
In debt 
• Cases take longer than average if they involve multiple debts, but less than 
average in all cases involving single debts, especially for NfPs.  
• Type of case is a particular issue for NfPs, who reported 76% of all debt cases, 
and for whom multiple debt cases average 146% of the fixed fee.  
In employment  
• Cases take longer than average if reported as unfair dismissal and very much 
longer than average if reported as discrimination. All other cases take very much 
shorter than average times.19  
The extent of work done for clients  
4.9 Suppliers are required to report whether a case 
• Finished at the first meeting with the client 
• Involved further work 
• Involved putting the case for the client 
• Involved representation at court or tribunal.  
4.10 It is hardly surprising that, with one exception,20 the average time spent on cases 
clearly reflected the extent of work done for clients.  
                                            
16 The first endpoint indicates the result of the case. The second endpoint indicates whether the case 
involved wider public benefits. The third endpoint indicates the stage at which the case concluded.  
17 Cases reported as “challenge” cost 175% of the proposed fixed fee on average for NfPs and 140% 
for solicitors 
18 Cases reported as “appeal” cases cost 204% of the proposed fixed fee for NfPs and 162% for 
solicitors. For appeals to the Commissioners the respective figures are 230% and 213%.  
19 Cases reported as unfair dismissal cost 180% of the proposed fixed fee for NfPs and 159% for 
solicitors. For discrimination cases the respective figures are 263% and 246%.  
20 In housing, solicitors’ cases reported as “putting the case” cost more than those reported as ending 
at representation. The reasons for this are not obvious to us.  
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 • Cases that finished at the first meeting with the client took substantially less time 
than average 
• Cases that involved “further work” took noticeably less time than average 
• Cases that involved putting the case for the client took noticeably more time than 
average 21 
• Cases that involved representation at court or tribunal took substantially more 
time than average. 22  
Results achieved for clients  
4.11 Cases which resulted in certain positive outcomes took longer than average. These 
included: 
• In housing, cases that resulted in the client being housed, re-housed or retaining 
their home 
• In benefits, cases that resulted in the client receiving a lump sum or property, or 
a new or increased regular payment 
• In debt, cases resulting in a reduction of the sum owed to a third party or a 
reduction of the client’s liability to make regular payments 
• In employment, cases resulting in the client receiving a lump sum or property 
4.12 Generally, across all categories, cases took less time than average if the outcome is 
recorded as   
• Client advised and taking action themselves  
• Client enabled to plan/manage better  
• Outcome not known  
Regional variations  
4.13 There are clear variations in average times between the regions in each category of 
law. The table below sets out the variations from the national averages of case 
lengths for NfPs (in minutes) and case costs for solicitors firms (in pounds) reported 
in each region.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
21 Such cases cost on average 149% of the proposed fixed fee for NfPs and 147% for solicitors in 
housing, 171% and 143% respectively in benefits, 206% and 212% in employment, and 150% for 
NfPs in debt.  
22 Such cases cost on average 168% of the proposed fixed fee for NfPs and 133% for solicitors in 
housing, 272% and 220% respectively in benefits, 402% and 364% in employment, and 196% for 
NfPs in debt.  
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Table 4: Regional variations in average case lengths/costs from the national 
averages 
 Housing Benefits Debt Employment 
 
 Nfps Sols NfPs Sols NfPs Sols NfPs Sols 
Birmingham +13 +£15 +16 +£12 -15 +£23 -80 -£72 
Brighton +15 -£80 +17 -£71 +29 -£23 +61 -£106 
Bristol -52 -£12 -31 -£12 -62 -£5 -62 -£38 
Cambridge -13 -£23 +27 +£22 +28 +£2 -18 -£30 
Cardiff -65 -£34 -28 -£32 +33 -£5 -88 -£166 
Leeds -68 -£44 -58 -£12 -4 +£5 +67 -£40 
Liverpool +73 -£58 -49 -£63 -15 -£18 +85 -£117 
London +93 +£46 +91 +£91 +26 +£64 +96 +£337 
Manchester -11 -£58 -40 -£16 -1 -£5 -116 +£9 
Newcastle +22 -£43 +32 -£26 +1 -£30 -83 -£121 
Nottingham +45 -£31 +2 +£41 +12 -£5 +93 -£89 
Reading -14 +£27 +11 -£4 +52 -£7 +71 -£65 
 
4.14 It will be noted, in particular that  
• The London figures are all substantially above average, and are the highest in all 
categories in both sectors except for NfP debt cases 
• Most notable are the London solicitors firms’ employment cases, which have an 
average cost that is over twice the national average.  
4.15 The following table compares the average case lengths/costs in London and the 
proposed fixed fees.  
Table 5: Average case lengths/costs in London compared to the proposed 
fixed fees 
Category NfPs Solicitors firms 
Housing 160% 144% 
Benefits 185% 165% 
Debt 146% 110% 
Employment 195% 294% 
 
Types of clients 
Disability 
4.16 Suppliers are asked to record whether the client considers himself or herself to have 
a disability as defined by the Disability Discrimination Act 1995.23 We have some 
                                            
23 The Act defines disability as a physical or mental impairment with long term, substantial effects on a 
person’s ability to perform day-to-day activities.  
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 doubts as to the accuracy of the figures provided, given in particular the high 
proportion of cases in which the client’s disability status was recorded as unknown.24 
4.17 There is some relationship between disability and average case times in housing, 
benefits and debt (for NfPs in particular) and a strong relationship in employment 
cases. 
4.18 In employment  
• For NfPs, cases for clients reported as disabled took substantially longer than 
average, costing on average 218% of the fixed fee, compared to 156% for those 
without a recorded disability.   
• For solicitors firms, the respective figures were 209% and 142%.  
Ethnicity  
4.19 Suppliers are asked to record the ethnicity of each client who signs a Legal Help 
form, using the 16 categories approved by the Commission for Racial Equality, or 
alternatively recording the client’s ethnicity as “unknown”. The following table 
distinguishes between those cases where the client was recorded as “White British” 
and all other cases [referred to as “BME”] except those where the clients’ ethnicity is 
recorded as unknown. The table sets out the average case lengths/costs for these 
two groups (in minutes for NfPs and pounds for solicitors firms), the average for all 
cases and the variance from the average of these two groups.    
Table 6: Comparison of average case lengths/costs between White British and 
BME clients 
Sector Category Averages   Variance  
  White 
British 
BME Overall White 
British 
BME 
NfP Debt 312 321 314 -2 +7 
 Benefits 262 301 274 -12 +27 
 Employment 407 476 430 -23 +46 
 Housing 219 270 234 -15 +36 
       
Solicitors Debt £147 £171 £152 -£5 +£19 
 Benefits £151 £230 £180 -£29 +£50 
 Employment £268 £496 £325 -£57 +£171 
 Housing £175 £234 £200 -£25 +£34 
 
4.20 These figures suggest that there is an “ethnicity effect” of varying degrees depending 
on the sector and the category of law. 
4.21 There is however a remarkable difference between London and all other regions in 
the ethnic profile of clients. The following table sets out the proportion of clients 
whose ethnicity was reported as other than White British.25  
 
 
                                            
24 The proportion of cases where the disability status was unknown varied between 16% and 37% 
across all four categories and both sectors.  
25 The balance were recorded as White British save for the proportion of cases where the client’s 
ethnicity is reported as unknown, which varies between 2% and 11% of cases.  
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Table 7: Proportion of BME clients 
               Housing Benefits Debt Employment 
London NfPs 73% 72% 65% 74% 
 Sols 68% 82% 66% 74% 
Outside London NfPs 20% 22% 12% 26% 
 Sols  14% 18% 10% 13% 
 
4.22 The high proportion of clients in London who are from BME communities means also 
that a high proportion of all BME clients are in London. The following table shows the 
national distribution of BME clients in these categories as between London and the 
rest of England and Wales.   
Table 8: Distribution of BME clients 
Category Number in 
London 
Percent in 
London 
Number 
outside 
London 
Percent 
outside 
London 
Total 
number 
Housing 19,413 64.3% 10,771 35.7% 30,184 
Benefits 9,846 41.6% 13,824 58.4% 23,670 
Debt 3,452 33.8% 6,749 66.2% 10,201 
Employment 1,564 51.0% 1500 49.0% 3,064 
Total 34,275 51.1% 32,844 48.9% 67,119 
 
4.23 As noted above, average case lengths/costs are much higher in London than in the 
rest of England and Wales. The following tables divide the national averages as 
between London and the rest of England and Wales.  
4.24 The figures for London (NfPs in minutes, solicitors firms in pounds) are as follows 
Table 9: Average case lengths/costs by ethnicity in London 
Sector Category Averages   Variance  
  White 
British 
BME Overall White 
British 
BME 
NfP Debt 353 336 340 +13 -4 
 Benefits 357 367 364 -7 +3 
 Employment 489 542 526 -37 +16 
 Housing 308 328 327 -19 +1 
       
Solicitors Debt £254 £199 £216 +£38 -£17 
 Benefits £291 £265 £270 +£21 -£5 
 Employment £596 £676 £662 -£66 +£14 
 Housing £242 £247 £246 -£4 +£1 
 
4.25 The figures for the rest of England and Wales are as follows 
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 Table 10: Average case lengths/costs by ethnicity outside London 
Sector Category Averages   Variance  
  White 
British 
BME Overall White 
British 
BME 
NfP Debt 311 314 312 -1 +2 
 Benefits 258 269 260 -2 +9 
 Employment 399 416 401 -2 +15 
 Housing 214 235 218 -4 +17 
       
Solicitors Debt £143 £151 £145 -£2 +£6 
 Benefits £143 £179 £151 -£8 +£28 
 Employment26 £249 £273 £248 +£1 +£15 
 Housing £161 £188 £167 -£6 +£21 
5 The problem: BME clients in London  
The “ethnicity effect” and the “London effect”  
5.1 The previous two tables suggest that there is an “ethnicity effect” in most cases, the 
exceptions being debt cases in London for both sectors and benefits cases for 
solicitors in London.  
5.2 It is vital that we understand why cases for BME clients take longer. There are likely 
to be some direct links, such as the fact that discrimination cases in employment 
take very much longer than other cases. In general however we think that the link is 
more likely to be indirect, suggesting that ethnicity is a proxy for other things, such as 
being new to the country, not understanding UK institutions, bureaucracies or 
procedures, and language difficulties.27   
5.3 Further research is clearly needed in order to ensure that specific needs, including 
those of BME clients, are served fairly and adequately in any new scheme. There 
must be a full race impact assessment before any changes are implemented.  
5.4 The figures suggest that the “London effect” is stronger than the “ethnicity effect”. 
The average case lengths/costs for both White British and BME clients in London are 
noticeably (and in some cases substantially) higher than those for both sets of clients 
outside London.   
5.5 We have noted already that the average case lengths/costs in London are the 
highest in all categories in both sectors except for NfP debt cases.  
5.6 We do not understand why average case lengths/costs are so much higher in 
London. We do not accept that suppliers in London are more “inefficient”, as seems 
to be implied by the LSC/DCA. It may be that providers in London deal on the whole 
with more complex cases. There is some evidence of this in the data that we have on 
NfP average case times.28 This would be understandable given the large number of  
                                            
26 In these cases the overall average is lower than both the White British and BME averages due to 
the fact that 7% of cases were recorded as “unknown”, with an average cost of £199, thus depressing 
the overall average.   
27 See the analysis of these issues by Hazel Genn and others in Tribunals for diverse users 
28 In 2004-05, in employment, NfPs in London reported a higher proportion of cases ending in 
representation and a higher proportion of discrimination cases. In welfare benefits, London NfPs 
report a significantly higher proportion of benefit challenge/appeal cases. In both categories there 
were higher than average proportions of cases reported as ending at the first meeting with the client 
and significantly fewer than average cases ending at the “further work” stage.  
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advice agencies and community groups in London, which may well be dealing with 
the less complex cases. Higher case lengths/costs may also reflect the high level of 
pressure on statutory and other services and the housing market in London. They 
may also reflect particular problems arising out of the nature and behaviour of the 
“other side” in many disputes.  
How will London suppliers react? 
5.7 The impact of the introduction of national fixed fees in London will depend on how 
London suppliers react.  
5.8 We do not believe that London suppliers will be able to make any significant 
“efficiency” gains in order to mitigate the effects of the introduction of national fixed 
fees. It seems to us they are likely to react in a number of different ways.  
5.9 Some will stop doing legal aid work either in particular categories of law or 
altogether.  
5.10 Some will have to adjust their case mix, by taking on more easy/short cases, and 
fewer complex/longer cases. 
• In benefits, this is likely to mean more “entitlement” and “review” cases, and 
fewer benefit challenges and appeals  
• In debt, this is likely to mean more cases involving single debts and fewer cases 
involving multiple debts  
• In employment, this is likely to mean more cases concerning employees’ terms 
and conditions (pay, holiday and sick leave entitlement etc) or wrongful 
dismissal, and fewer cases involving unfair dismissal and discrimination.  
5.11 Much will depend on the extent to which suppliers are prepared to gamble that 
individual cases will cross the threshold of three times the fixed fee, and thus qualify 
for payment, on hourly rates, as “exceptional” cases. The LSC has stated however 
that it will assess such claims, adding the further risk for suppliers that the costs they 
claim will be reduced below the threshold, with the effect that they only receive the 
fixed fee.  
5.12 It seems to us that there will inevitably be an impact on the quality of services 
provided.  
5.13 Following the LSC’s classification system, suppliers will have to make decisions 
about whether they should finish a case at the first meeting with the client, or do 
further work (and how much), the extent to which they “put the case” for the client, 
and whether they represent the client at court or tribunal. It seems to us inevitable 
that suppliers’ decisions will be influenced by the value of the fixed fee (unless they 
are satisfied that the case will qualify as “exceptional”).  
5.14 Such decisions will in turn be likely to have an effect on the outcomes achieved for 
clients. Suppliers are likely to be conscious that achieving certain positive outcomes 
for clients is likely to involve further work on their part. At the least, they may be less 
prepared to “go the extra mile” for clients whose cases do not appear to be 
particularly promising.  
Who will be affected? 
5.15 If any of these changes in supplier behaviour take place as a result of the 
introduction of national fixed fees in London, the losers will be clients and potential 
clients, the great majority of whom are members of BME communities. The 
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 introduction of national fixed fees in the social welfare law categories of housing, 
debt, benefits and employment is likely to have a discriminatory impact  
• on Londoners with more complex problems or cases 
• on members of BME communities generally (given the “ethnicity effect” and 
because half of BME clients in these categories are in London) 
• on BME Londoners (who represent approximately three quarters of all clients in 
these categories of law in London) 
• on BME Londoners with more complex problems or cases.       
 
 
Adam Griffith 
Advice Services Alliance 
June 2007  
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